Almotamar.net -
With Gaza poised on the brink of civil war, pity poor Mahmoud Abbas, who took over as president of the Palestinian Authority two and a half years ago, after the death of Yasser Arafat. An academic by profession, Abbas has tried mightily to lead the Palestinian people with civility, adherence to democratic principles, and public disdain for violence.

He never had a chance. Palestinian rivals, both from his own Fatah party and from the Islamists of Hamas, as well as the Israelis, perceived Abbas’s civility as weakness.

Abbas introduced a totally different style of management from that of Arafat. Dressed in his military suit until his last day, Abu Ammar (Arafat’s revolutionary nom de guerre) did not believe that it was time to become a civilian president while the Israeli occupation continued. Dressed in a suit and tie, Abbas introduced professional Western-style management to the presidency, but had no idea what to do with grass-roots militants.

One of the first comments I heard from journalists was that Abbas, a family man, went home at lunchtime and worked regular business hours. His other name, Abu Mazen, is not a revolutionary name but reflects the practice of naming a person as the father of his eldest son. Abbas’s son, Mazen, runs a local advertising agency.

In his attempt to counter Arafat’s political corruption and micromanagement, Abbas lost whatever chance he had to maintain the loyalty of the Fatah leadership, newly appointed PA officials, security personnel, and, most importantly, local militants. Calling for national elections, while politically correct, was political suicide, for he lacked any idea of the possible outcome and did very little to ensure the discipline of Fatah. An attempt at a primary to choose Fatah candidates backfired, owing to fraud and the losers’ refusal to honor the results. Rival Fatah candidates then split the party’s vote, allowing Hamas an easy victory.

Negotiations with the Israelis was one area where Abbas, who led the Oslo process that saw the creation of the Palestinian Authority, thought he could do well. But, unlike Oslo, when Abbas was working under Arafat and able to project power from that base, as Palestinian president he was both negotiator and supposedly the center of power. The Israelis discerned Abbas’s weakness early on, and once Hamas was elected in a landslide, had little incentive to help him despite the prodding of the United States.

Not only was Abbas politically weak, with few friends among Fatah militants, but he also didn’t show much interest in what was happening in Gaza. He spent as little time as he could there, preferring his Ramallah office on the West Bank and spending time with visiting politicians and meeting world leaders there or abroad. And, while he was technically the commander-in-chief of the Palestinian forces, these forces lacked the will to stand up to Hamas’s growing power.

The economic siege on Palestine after the Hamas victory further weakened Abbas. With no salaries to pay teachers (or even the security services), his ability to influence even his own presidential guard was severely limited. During a meeting, which I attended, with a delegation from the International Press Institute to obtain the release of the BBC journalist Alan Johnston, abducted in Gaza in March, Abbas explained the PA’s inability and weakness. Soldiers march on their stomachs, he said, and complained that his own forces have not been able to renew their equipment or obtain badly needed ammunition for seven years.

Ironically, the Israelis and the world community, which had basically frozen Palestinian finances, wanted Abbas to continue to control the security forces, despite Fatah’s loss in the parliamentary elections. Israel and the US led a virtual blockade on Palestine, with Israel refusing to return collected taxes and the US pressing world banks not to recognize the signature of the Palestinian finance minister. The nominal reason is Hamas’s refusal to recognize Israel. But most Arab countries also don’t recognize Israel, and yet the banking world deals with them normally.

A compromise power-sharing agreement brokered by the Saudis initially seemed to be a solution. According to the Mecca agreement signed last February, Hamas would give up important ministries such as finance, interior, and foreign affairs, while Abbas would ensure the end of the economic siege. Four months later, however, the siege has not been lifted, and the Hamas ministers (such as former Foreign Minister Mahmoud Zahhar and Interior Minster Said Siyam) who were forced out now feel betrayed and are demanding their jobs back.

If the Israelis and the international community want Abbas to remain in power, they must change their approach dramatically, by lifting the economic siege and providing his presidency with military and political support. And, if the Israelis are convinced that Abbas is too weak to do anything, they can help the Palestinians by releasing the Fatah strongman, Marwan Barghouti, from an Israeli jail.

Otherwise, Abbas will be left with no alternative but to follow the advice of a leading Palestinian professor, Ali Jirbawi, who suggested simply that Abbas should dissolve the Palestinian Authority and return power to the Israelis, who remain legally and practically responsible for the areas they occupied in 1967.

Daoud Kuttab a Palestinian director of the Institute of Modern Media at Al Quds University in Ramallah.

Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2007.
www.project-syndicate.org